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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
AILEEN WEBB, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
HERBERT A. SNOW, ERASTUS P. 
SNOW, ANN PYMM SNO·W, EVA-
L YN S. DE·CKER and AGNES S. J 
GALLACHER, 
Appellants. 
No. 6381 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case the appellee sued appellants for dam-
. ages suffered as a result of an alleged assault and battery 
taking place on the loading platform of the Giant Racer 
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2 
at Saltair Beach on the evening of June 22, 1940. This 
appeal is for the purpose of securing a reversal of a 
judgment in the trial court of Honorable P. C. Evans, 
wherein the appellee recovered a judgment against the 
appellants, based upon a verdict of the jury, for the 
sum of $5,022.50. 
At the time of the alleged assault the appellant5 
were the owners and operators of that certain amuse-
ment device known as the Giant Racer, which they op-
erated under separate ownership from, but in connec-
tion with Saltair Beach. The payment of the admis-
sion to Saltair did not entitle one to ride the Racer-
that called for an additional fee, ·which appellee, or 
any of her party, never paid or offered to pay. In order 
to facilitate the operations of said device there has· been 
provided by the appellants and their predecessors in in-
terest, a platform· upon which the patrons coming to 
ride the racer approach the cars that run upon two sets 
of tracks that course the racer. 
The approach to the racer loading platforms, to-
gether with the tracks upon which the cars operate, and 
the fences maintained as a part of said platform, are 
all set out in the following drawing ·which conforms to 
a blackboard drawing used for purposes of illustration 
at the time of the trial. This drawing has been ap-
proved by counsel for appellee, ·who agree that the same 
may be used as illustrative of the condition existing on 
the premises at the time complained of in this case. 
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Note: There is no ga~. 
fence or other barrier be-
tween the entrance and 
either loadiD¥ platform 
(B or C). Fares are not 
collected until passengers 
are in car seats. 
Scale 1/16"=1' 
Loading Platform 
of Giant Racer 
at Saltair. 
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In operating the racer the appellants employed four 
men all of whom worked on 'the platform marked "A," 
which platform is from eighteen inches to two feet low-
er than Platform "C" the loading platform. Sam 
Whitehead managed the operation of the racer and 
141 besides handled the brake lever at a point near the south 
end of Platform "A." With this brake Mr. White-
head controlled the cars as they completed their trip 
around the racer and came into the loading station. On 
the evening in question Mr. Whitehead never at any 
time left his place of employment. The other three men 
on the platform were employed as follows : When the 
two cars, with three seats in each car making six seats 
in all, would pull up for loading Jack Lampere would 
take care of the people in the two front seats, John 
Lampere the people in the two middle seats, and Earl 
144 Cochran the people in the two rear seats. Each seat 
had a capacity of two people to a seat, although some-
times three people rode in a seat. At the time in ques-
tion Mr. Whitehead and the boys were operating only 
the cars running on the west set of tracks since that set 
was sufficient to take care of the people then desiring 
to ride. 
Jack Lampere's duty was to watch the cars on the 
side operating and get them onto the cog chain that 
pulled them out and up the first incline of the racer to 
232 the apex of the first dip, from which point they started 
on their trip around the racer by gravity. It was also his 
duty to watch that people did not come down on the side 
that was not running. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the four men 
mentioned above were the only employees of appellants, 
'1 
I• 
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that \vere in or arotmd the racer or had anything to do 
with its operation on that night. 
The appellee's evidence shows that Bernard L. 
Bettilyon and the appellee are brother and sister and 
that on the afternoon of June 22, 1940, Mr. Bettilyon, 
i2 from about 3 :30 to i :30 had been attending a 20-30 
i3 Club convention at theN ewhouse Hotel, and during that 
time had had rna ybe six or seven cocktails; that about 
7 :30 that evening Mr. Bettilyon drove Mr. Cottrell to 
the Bettilyon home where Mrs. Cottrell already was, and 
the two couples had dinner there together. At about 
9:30, in Mr. Cottrell's car, they all went to the Saltair 
Depot near the Fairgrounds and there boarded the train 
for Saltair. At Saltair the group paid their admission 
to the pavillion and went up to the dance floor, where 
they danced two or three times. Upon leaving the dance 
floor, about 10 :30 to 10 :45, and before the intermis-
sion at the dance floor, Mr. Bettilyon and his wife came 
74 down to the foot of the pavillion stairs., where they met 
the appellee and her husband, Kenneth Webb. From 
that point the four of them went over to 1the racer and 
stopped at the point marked "F" on the drawing above, 
where they say they stayed for fifteen or twenty min-
utes waiting for a ride, the loading area serving the 
76 cars on the west set of tracks being entirely filled up so 
that people were blocked to about the end of the load-
ing area. The west line cars were the only ones operat-
ed on the tracks at that time. There were two empty 
cars standing on the east tracks near the loading plat-
form, but the west cars were the only ones that were 
running and these were sufficient to take care of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Trans. 
Page 
6 
crowd acccording to the testimony of appellant's wit-
ness~s. 
After standing there for some time Mr. Bettilyon 
77 and his group moved further along toward the east, at 
which point Mr. Bettilyon left his party with the state-
ment that he would go down and get the boys to start 
up the other cars, and went to point "L," where leaning 
against the fence he spoke to one of the boys over on 
the loading platform asking that they start the cars on 
that side. He was told that they would be started later. 
78 The conversation was in a friendly tone. 
A little later he squatted down at about point "L" 
and still continued to talk with the boys on the loading 
platform. Eventually he said something to the effect that 
since they didn't want their (his group's) money they 
would take it and give it to another concession, and one 
of the boys said that if they didn't like the service he 
79 knew ·what he could do, and Mr. Bettilyon said that he 
did, whereupon one of the boys said something to the 
effect "to get the hell out of there, something like that 
or mind my own business. and I said 'go jump in the 
lake' and then turned and started north. I was a little 
angry and I said 'go jump in the lake' and started on 
out." The fellow who made the remark was over on 
platform "A," the working platform.. He leaped 
across and upon reaching Mr. Bettilyon turned him 
80 around and shoved him back using both hands. Mr. 
Bettilyon said he was completely taken off his feet but 
he immediately swung at the appellant's employee and 
missed him. "Employee flew right in and the next 
81 moment we were fighting for all we were both worth." 
Thereafter Mr. Bettilyon said that two other men 
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came from the platform and started right in fighting, 
so that at point "M'' on the drawing there were three 
of them· on him. He kept moving to·ward the north end 
of the platform, when Mr. Webb came in and started 
pushing these fellows away saying, " 'Here, here, you 
can't do this,' or something like that, 'there is no point 
in all this.· Then he turned and said, 'Come on Lou, 
let's get out of here' and I said 'Nothing would please 
82 me more.'., Just about then Webb was hit and immedi-
ately the whole thing started again, two more men com-
ing in until there were five or six men fighting Mr. 
Webb and B·ettilyon. At point "0" Mr. Bettilyon was 
knocked out. 
In the former case Mr. Bettilyon testified: "He 
(the man coming over from the loading platform) 
88 turned me around, and shoved me, both. ~I swung im-
mediately he stepped in and we were fighting." 
At this point, from the testimony of Mrs. Bettilyon, 
it appears that Mr. Webb was knocked to his knees, then 
Mrs. Webb stepped out from behind the fence at about 
point "P" and said to the man, " 'You can't do that to 
my husband,' " and slapped him in the face and he 
95 struck her knocking her down. 
% 
Mr. Webb by that time got to his feet and came 
over and lifted her to a sitting position, patting her 
cheeks, from which point she was taken over to a bench. 
The appellant's evidence on these vital points is to 
the effect that while Jack Lampere was collecting his 
fares and getting the cars ready to go out he saw Mr. 
Bettilyon and his party of four, of whom appellee was 
one, stardng past point "G" on the drawing going to-
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8 
ward the east side and he motioned them back toward 
the west ; that three of 1he parties stopped near the 
corner of the fence but Mr. Bettilyon kept going down to. 
point "L"; that while on his way there Jack Lampere 
motioned him two or three times to go back and at the 
same time asked him to go !back on the other side. The 
reason for trying to keep these people back, was that 
with them around there other people would follow and 
cause the boys trouble in their operation of the cars that 
w.ere in operation on the west side. When Jack had got-
ten the car he was then loading on its way, he went back 
and asked Mr. Bettilyon to go around on the other side, 
whereupon Mr. Bettilyon said, "what other side," and 
Jack told him the other side of the house, following 
which there was some further conversation. Then Jack 
235 went to tend to another car, Earl Cochran, taking care 
146 of the two rear seats, followed up the conversation with 
Mr. Bettilyon by asking him to go around on the other 
side but Mr. Bettilyon just stood there while other 
people continued to start around on the side where he 
was and had to be waved back. After collecting for 
one or two cars Earl again asked Mr. Bettilyon to go 
around on the other side and he stood up and told Earl 
to "put him around there, or I asked him to go out, is 
what I asked him to do, and he says come and put him 
around there, put him out, and I says 'well I will do 
that.' " Earl then crossed from platform "A" to plat-
form at point "L" where Mr. Bettilyon was standing. 
Mr. Bettilyon was facing south and as Earl came up 
on the platform, facing him "I asked him again to go out 
and he took a swing at me * * * I grabbed hold of his 
hands by the wrist * * * and held him for a minute there 
:~ 
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and tried to get him out and he wrenched loose from me 
148 and started to fighting. I was just getting out of the 
way of him as best I could * * * I never attempted to hit 
him at all. Then Jack came over on the platform and 
he swung at Jack and then Jack hit him." About this 
time Mr. vVebb came down, "'I think he swung at Jack 
and Jack hit him. I am not sure of that." Then J oh~ 
came over right after but before he came "there was 
Jack and I and Mr. Bettilyon and Mr. Webb, and we 
149 \vere right around points 'M' and 'N.'" 
During all this time there was fighting going on. 
About the time John came in Bernard Lynch, known as 
150 ''Slim" came over. He was in civilian clothes and was 
not working for the racer. "He took hold of Mr. 
Bettilyon and said, 'I don't know what it is all about 
but if Earl says you are going out you are going out.' " 
'~Slim" took hold of Mr. Bettilyon by the arms from 
behind. At this time they were over near point "0," 
and with "Slim'' holding Mr. Bettilyon and attempting 
to get him out, the fight was over. Then Mr. Bettilyon 
151 wrenched loose and started to fight again, that is when 
Jack hit him, and about that time Mr. Cochran hit Mr. 
Webb who was over between "G" and "F." At this 
time Earl heard John say, "Watch out for him." This 
was with reference to another strange man who came in 
and took a swing at John and fell to the floor. Earl 
did not see Mrs. Webb until he heard someone say that 
"There is a woman been hit." When he looked around 
he saw her in a sitting position on the floor. "She was 
just sitting down crying. I never saw her stretched out 
and unconscious." "Then Webb and I forgot our 
fracas and Jack and I took her by. the arms and picked 
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her up and Mr. Webb says, 'I will take care of her,' and 
he took her." 
Mrs. Webb, in giving her estimate of the time oc-
cupied by all the fight, said, "It wasn't a .. long fight, 
133 'absolutely the fastest thing I have ever seen.' '' 
237 Jack Lampere's story of what happened to Mrs. 
Webb was that after he had :hit Mr. Bettilyon, who had 
fallen down, he looked around and saw Mr. Webb over 
to the west from where he was standing and that just 
.as he had taken a couple of steps toward Mr. Webb a 
hand came around over his shoulder and hit him in the 
face, without knowing who it was he turned around 
quickly with his open hand which came in contact with 
someone, he didn't know who at that time but after-
wards found out that it was Mrs. Webb. Some man 
said, "Who hit that woman?" and he turned around to 
see Mrs. Webb sitting on the floor with her hands to 
her face crying. Earl Cochran came over and he and 
238 Jack each taking an arm picked her up off the floor and 
gave her to Mr. Wehb. 
Mrs. Webb first filed her complaint on September 
6, 1940, setting out an entirely different set of facts than 
that presented by her amended complaint filed Decem-
ber 12, 1940. ~It was not until she filed her amendment 
that she set out that she had suffered a miscarriage as a 
result of what happened. 
Further facts as evidenced by the record will be 
developed in the argument of the errors hereafter as-
signed in support of appellants' appeal. 
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ST A TEMEN1' OF ERRORS 
The errors of the trial court relied upon by appellants are 
as follo,vs : 
1. The court erred in overruling appellants' objection to, 
and permitting appellee as a witness in her own behalf to answer 
the follovv~ing question on direct examination: 
"Can you tell the court and jury whether or not 
you 'vere pregnant on the evening of June 22, 1940 ?" 
(Tr. 127.) 
2. The court erred in denying appellants' motion to strike 
the question set out in the next preceding assignment and the 
answers thereto. (Tr. 128) 
3. The court erred in overruling appellants' objection to 
the question asked by counsel on cross examination of appel-
lants' witness Earl Cochran as follows : 
"Now, you have described those duties you have 
in connection with the collecting of fares. Is acting 
as a bouncer for the ejection or eviction of people that 
you think should be evicted, also a part of your duties?" 
(Tr. 160) 
4. The court erred in overruling appellants' objection to 
the question asked by counsel of appellee's witness Dr. Giesy 
as follows: 
"Doctor, assuming that the plaintiff in this case 
had passed her regular menstrual period by about two 
weeks, and that on June 22, 1940, she was struck a 
blow of sufficient force to cause her to sit down violent-
ly, or to fall down on her back, and that some five or 
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six days thereafter she suffered a severe vaginal hem-
orrhage, accompanied by large and numerous blood 
clots, and that she thereafter so suffered and continued 
to suffer hemorrhages and blood flow and clots for ten 
days or two weeks thereafter, and that after that she 
continued to hemorrhage up until approximately J anu-
ary 1, 1941 : Taking all of these facts, as I have just 
given them to you, together with your personal diag-
nosis and examination of the patient on October 22nd, 
together with your personal know ledge and experience 
in the field of medicine, what is your professional 
opinion as to whether or not on June 22, 1940, Mrs. 
Webb was or was not pregnant?" (Tr. 177) 
5. The court erred in overruling appellants' objection to 
the question asked of appellants' witness Dr. Skidmore on cross 
examination as follows : 
"Assuming that on the evening in question, on the 
22nd of June, 1940, Mrs. Webb was struck a blow by 
the fist of a man, and she was propelled violently to the 
floor at the place she was standing, and was knocked 
wholly unconscious for some considerable period of 
time, that later she was revived and escorted to her 
automobile, with help, and that she went home, and five 
or six days thereafter she had nausea in the stomach; 
she had severe backaches; the side of her face was swol-
len and bruised ; she suffered severe headaches, and five 
or six days after this occurrence she suffered continuous 
violent vaginal hemorrhages, accompanied by large 
clots of blood, for ten or fourteen days thereafter: 
Would that state of facts, Doctor, enable you to ven-
ture an opinion as to whether or not this hemorrhage, 
these hemorrhages that she suffered were as a result 
of the blows inflicted upon her?" (Tr. 206) 
o. ' 
~ed 
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6. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' re-
quested Instruction No. 3 reading as follows : 
''The court instructs the jury that defendants' em-
ployee \Yas the best judge of what was necessary to 
defend himself against the attack of plaintiff and of 
the means to be used for his own proteotion. When 
the defendants' employee was attacked he was obliged 
to exercise his best judgment at that time as to what 
he should do in his own defense and his judgment is 
one which, if honestly and reasonably exercised, is con-
trolling. It is absolutely controlling unless you find 
that his exercise of it at the time and under the circum-
stances, was such an exercise as was unreasonable under 
all the evidence in the case. So, if you find that from 
the nature of the assault committed upon defendants' 
employee by plaintiff he had a right to think he was 
being attacked by a person it was necessary for him 
to defend himself against, and in so acting his hand 
came in contact with plaintiff, without thought on his 
part that it might be a woman, then Jhe plaintiff can-
not recover in this action." (Exception Tr. 251) 
7. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' requested 
Instruction No. 4 reading as follows : 
"You are instructed that the defendants' employee 
had a right to protect himself against ·an assault by 
plaintiff. If you. find that plaintiff assaulted ·defendants' 
employee in such a manner and under such conditions 
as to naturally excite an ordinarily careful and prudent 
man in the place of said emplo)liee under the same cir-
cumstances and conditions, then the said employee can-
not he held to the greatest nicety in the calculation of 
the amount of force which he should use; and even if 
he did use more force than was necessary, still if under 
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the circumstances he acted as an ordinarily careful and 
prudent man under the influence of plaintiff's conduct, 
as you find it to be, would have acted under the same 
circumstances and conditions, then you should find in 
favor of the defendants-'no cause of action.' " (Ex-
ception Tr. 251) 
8. The court erred tn refusing to give appellants' re-
quested Instruction No. 5 reading as follows : 
"You are instructed that these defendants have 
the full right to determine the operation of the scenic 
racer and that they, through their servants, having 
determ·ined not to operate the east set of tracks or green 
cars, then Bernard L. Bettilyon had no right to go on 
that side of the racer platform. You are further in-
structed that having gone on the east side if you find 
that his being there did in any way interfere with or 
cause trouble to defendants' servants in their operation 
of the racer that the servants of defendants had a law-
ful right to use such reasonable force-as was necessary, 
after requesting Bernard L. Bettilyon to leave that part 
of defendants' property, to remove him from the place 
in question. You are also instructed that if in using 
force to remove said Bernard L. B'ettilyon that he at-
tempted to or did start to fight or hit the servant or 
servants of defendants and as a result of such assault 
or attempted assault the said Bernard L. Bettilyon was 
later injured, and that thereafter this plaintiff's husband 
voluntarily came into the fight and that later this plain-
tiff herself left a place of safety and slapped defendants' 
employee in the face, as a result of which plaintiff was 
struck by said employee, then plaintiff cannot recover 
in this case and your verdict will be for the defendants, 
and each of them, 'no cause of action.' " (Exception Tr. 
251) 
Ill 
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9. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' re-
quested Instruction No. 6 reading as follows : 
"If you find from· all the evidence that plaintiff 
struck defendants' employee when said employee was 
not expecting such an assault and said employee had 
reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that it 
was necessary to protect himself and in protecting him-
self he turned quickly and struck plaintiff but used no 
more force or violence than to him honestly and reason-
ably appeared necessary to repel a threatening injury, 
· then under such circumstances the defendants.' employee 
did no wrong and plaintiff has no right to recover 
damages in this case." (Exception Tr. 251) 
10. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' re-
quested Instruction No. 7 reading as follows : 
"You are instructed that Bernard L. Bettilyon had 
no right to be on the east or green car side of the plat-
form in question without the consent of defendants. So, 
if you find that he, being on that side without right, 
refused to leave the east side of said platform· when so 
requested by defendants' servants and that said servants 
then went to said Bernard L. Bettilyon at his dare and 
invitation to induce him to vacate the east side of said 
platform, and that as a result of the effort of defendants' 
servants to induce him to leave that part of defendants' 
premises the said Bernard L. Bettilyon, while said 
servants were in the exercise of only such reasonable 
force as was necessary to remove plaintiff, struck at 
defendants' servant and started to fight as a result of 
which he suffered some injury, then the plaintiff in this 
case cannot justify herself in leaving a place of safety 
and committing an assault upon the employee of these 
defendants and therefore plaintiff cannot recover in 
this case and your verdict must be for the defendants, 
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and each of them, and against the plaintiff-'no cause 
of action.' " (Exception Tr. 251-252) 
11. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' re-
quested Instruction No. 8 reading as follows : 
"You are instructed that the lawful owner or oc-
cupant ~f premises may rightfully restrict the use of .~~1 
his premises to his business guests and this he may 
do by word of mouth as well as by erecting signs or 
barricades or by using other means of giving notice 
of the restricted use. If a business guest refuses to quit 
a restricted portion of the owner's or occupant's prem-
ises after verbal request so to do, and reasonable op-
portunity has been given him to depart, he thereby 
becomes a trespasser and may be ejected by the use of 
such reasonable force as is necessary under the circum-
stances. So, in this case, if you find the acts of which 
the plaintiff complains arose out of the use of such 
force on the part of the employees of the defendants or 
an exercise on their part of the right to defend them-
selves against attack by Mr. Bettilyon, then plaintiff 
cannot recover in this action." (Exception Tr. 252) 
12. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' re-
quested 'Instruction No. 9 reading as follows : 
"You are instructed that if you find from the 
evidence that when Bernard Lynch went into the 
trouble going on at the place in question here the alter-
cation was brought to a stop by his taking hold of Mr. 
Bettilyon and attempting to get him away from the 
troUJble and that Mr. Bettilyon then broke away from 
him and charged at Jack Lampere, who at that time in 
self-defense struck Mr. Bettilyon, that then Mr. Betti-
lyon was the aggressor; and if you further find that 
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~Ir. \\'ebb was still in the altercation along with Mr. 
Bettilyon then I instruct you that plaintiff had no right 
to leave a place of safety, go up to Mr. Lampere and 
strike him, and that she cannot recover in this action 
against these defendants." (Exception Tr. 252) · 
13. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' re-
quested Instruction No. 12 reading as follows : 
"The plaintiff in this action has alleged that at the 
time of the alleged assault and battery she was preg-
nant and that as a result of said alleged assault and bat-
tery she suffered a m·iscarriage. The court instructs 
you that there is no substantial evidence that plaintiff 
was pregnant at the time of the alleged assault and 
!battery and you are therefore instructed to disregard 
this phase of the case in your deliberations." (Excep-
tion Tr. 252) 
14. The court erred tn refusing to give appellants' re-
quested Instruction No. 13 reading as follows : 
"The plaintiff in this action has alleged that at the 
time of the alleged assault and battery she was preg-
nant and that as a result of said alleged assault and bat-
tery she suffered a miscarriage. The court instructs 
you that there is no substantial evidence that the mis-
carriage, if any, was caused by or contributed to by the 
alleged assault and battery and you are therefore in-
structed to disregard this phase of the case 1n your 
deliberations." (Exception Tr. 252) 
15. The court erred in failing and refusing to instruct or 
otherwise present to the jury the appellants' theory or theories 
of their defense or defenses to the alleged cause of action sued 
upon by plaintiff. (Exception Tr. 252) 
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16. The court erred in giving to the jury Instruction No. 
4 reading as fallows : 
"The court instructs you, if you find from the 
evidence that the plaintiff's admission to Saltair Beach 
was paid, that she was a guest and had a right to remain 
there as long as said resort remained open to the public 
that evening." (Exception Tr. 246) ·:~( 
17. The court erred in giving to the jury Instruction No. 
5 reading as follows : 
"The court instructs you if you find from the 
evidence that the plaintiff was apprehensive that her 
husband and brother, or either of them, were in danger 
of bodily harm, and that she interceded in the affray in 
order to try to protect either or both of them, that she ~ 
was justified in doing so. If you further find from 
the evidence that as a result of her participation in the 
affray she was. rendered unconscious by a blow from 
one of the defendants' employees, the mere fact that 
she participated in the affray would not bar her from 
recovering damages from the defendants." (Excep-
tion Tr. 246) 
18. The court erred in giving to the jury those parts of 
Instruction No. 5 reading as follows : 
"First. 'The court instructs you if you find from 
the evidence that the plaintiff was apprehensive that 
her husband and brother, or either of them, were in 
danger of bodily harm, and that she interceded in the 
affray in order to try to protect either or both of them, 
that she was justified in doing so.' " (Exception Tr. 
253) 
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"Second. 'If you further find from the evidence 
that as a result of her participation in the affray she 
was rendered unconscious by a blow from one of the 
defendants' employees, the mere fact that she partici-
pated in the affray would not bar her from recovering 
damages from the defendants.'" (Exception Tr. 254) 
19. The court erred in giving to the jury ~Instruction No. 
6 reading as follows : 
''A person is justified in using sufficient force to 
protect members of his or her family provided the 
apparent danger is such as to induce one exercising a 
reasonable and proper judgment to interfere to prevent 
a consummation of the injury." (Tr. 246) 
20. The court erred in giving to the jury Instruction No. 
7 reading as follows : 
"The court instructs you that if you believe from 
the evidence that the plaintiff was pregnant at the time 
she was rendered unconscious by the blow delivered by 
one of the defendants' employees, and as a result of 
said blow and being knocked to the floor she suffered a 
miscarriage and thereby the loss of her unborn child, 
you may award her money damages for the loss of said 
urrborn child." (Tr. 246-247) 
21. The court erred in giving to the jury those parts of 
Instruction No. 7 reading as follows : 
"First. 'The court instructs you that if you be-
lieve from the evidence that the plaintiff was pregnant 
at the time she was rendered unconscious by the blow 
delivered hy one of the defendants' employees.' (Ex-
ception Tr. 254) 
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"Second. 'And as a result of said blow and being 
knocked to the floor she suffered a miscarriage and 
thereby the loss of her unborn child, you may award her 
money damages for the loss of said unborn child.'" 
(Exception Tr. 254) 
22. The court erred in giving to the jury Instruction No.. 
10 reading as follows : 
"The court instructs you, members of the jury, 
that if you find the issues in this case in favor of plain-
tiff and against the defendants, you may find for the 
plaintiff such a sum as will compensate her for the 
following damages, not to exceed $5,000.00: 
1. The actual personal injuries which she suffered; 
2. The consequent pain and suffering which she 
suffered as a result of her physical injuries; 
3. Money damages for the loss of her unborn child 
as a result of said miscarriage. 
In addition to the amount named· above, you may 
also assess such damages as will compensate for the 
loss or injury to her clothing, not to exceed the sum 
of $75.00." (Tr. 247-248) 
23. The court erred in giving to the jury those parts of 
Instruction No. 10 reading as follows : 
"First. 'The actual personal injuries which she 
suffered.' " (Exception Tr. 254) 
"Second. The consequent pain and suffering 
which she suffered as a result of her physical injuries." 
(Exception Tr. 254) 
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"Third. 'Money damages for the loss of her un-
born child as a result of said miscarriage.' " ( Excep-
tion Tr. 255) 
··Fourth. 'In addition to the amount named above, 
you may .also assess such damages as will compensate 
for the loss or injury to her clothing, not to exceed the 
sum of $22.50,' and" ((Exception Tr. 255) 
"'Fifth. 'The total amount of all damages which · 
you may find for the plaintiff cannot exceed the sum 
of $5022.50.' .. (Exception Tr. 255) 
24. The court erred in receiving the verdict and enter-
ing judgment thereon in that the verdict is excessive and 
against the law. 
25. The court erred in denying appellants' motion for a 
new trial, which motion was based upon the grounds recited in 
the Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial (Tr. 265) 
which grounds are as follows : 
"1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, abuse of discretion by the court 
which prevented the defendants from having a fair 
trial. 
"2. Misconduct of the jury. 
"3. Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
"4. Excessive damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
"5. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver-
dict or decision, and that it is against the law. 
"6. Error in law occurring at .the trial and ex-
cepted to by the defendants. 
"7. Newly discovered evidence material for the 
defendants which it could not, with reasonable dili-
gence, have discovered and produced at the trial." 
(Exception Tr. 265) , 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANTS' THEORY 
In presenting appellants' defense in this case counsel filed 
with the court various requests which counsel conceived of as 
stating the law applicable to appellants' theory of the issues in 
controversy. The court did not instruct the jury as requested 
by appellants and failed wholly to give to the jury any instruc-
tions that did present appellants' theory of the case. 
It was and now is appellants' theory of this case, which 
is sustained by evidence at every point, that: 
The appellee and her party, at the time of the altercation 
or subsequent thereto, never had offered to pay or paid there-
quired fee for a ride on the racer; that if they had ever intended 
to ride they had abandoned the idea as expressed by them in 
saying that they would spend their money at some other con-
cession; (Tr. 78) that the fact was that Mr. Bettilyon, brother 
of appellee, was the leader of the party and that following his 
approximately four hours at the highball convention at the 
Newhouse Hotel (Tr. 72-73) that he was at Saltair to do fool-
ish and uncalled for things for the amusement of his party; 
that in going down on the east side, he was at a point where 
he had no right to be, therefore, appellants' boys after several 
times inviting him to leave were fully within their rights in 
going over to him· to try and get him around where he would 
not cause them trouble in the operation of the racer; that for 
him to be where he was created a constant .hazard to the safety 
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of the racer operation, because it diverted the attention of the 
boys from their work; that when they invited him to leave and 
he did not, he became a trespasser and was subject to removal ; 
that the evidence sho\ved that when Earl Cochran went over 
at Bettilyon' s invitation to assist him to a point of safety and 
under appellee's testimony was using no more force than neces-
sary (Tr. 146-7) and under appellants' evidence using no force 
at all, Bettilyon "swung at him"; (Tr. 80) and thereby became 
the aggressor in the altercation that followed; that under ap-
pellants' evidence and particularly "Slim" Lynch's testimony 
(Tr. 148) which is that of a disinterested witness, with Mr. 
Webb. appellee's husband, coming in, the entry of Jack Lam-
pere into the affray was justified; that when "Slim" came in 
and took hold of Mr. Bettilyon and started removing him that 
the entire matter had come to a settlement (Tr. 148) and that 
when Mr. Bettilyon broke loose and started to fight anew, 
again, he was the aggressor and wholly responsible for what 
happened; that when Mr. Bettilyon was knocked down the 
entire brawl was again at a point of rest; that the appellee in 
stepping out from a place of safety and striking Jack Lampere 
was in no better position than was Mr. Bettilyon or her husband 
and further that there was no excuse for her as a reasonably 
prudent person stepping out and striking Jack as she did at 
the time she did. 
We maintain further that the evidence as to appellee's 
pregnancy and alleged miscarriage was not sufficient, but if it 
were admitted, for the sake of argument, then damages are so 
excessive as to show prejudice on the part of the jury. 
In considering the appellants' assignments of error counsel 
will group them under just as few main heads as practicable. 
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II. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR HAVING TO DO 
WITH PREGNANCY AND MISCARRIAGE 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 AND· 2 
In the first Assignment of Error the appellants contend 
that the court erred in overruling appellants' objection to and 
permitting appellee, as a witness in her own behalf, to answer 
the following question on direct examination: 
"Can you tell the court and jury whether or not 
you were pregnant on the evening of June 22, 1940 ?'" 
(Tr. 127) 
Appellants' counsel in making his objection to the question 
stated that the witness. was not shown to be qualified to make 
a conclusion of that kind and the trial court in overruling the 
objection said: 
"That would depend. After about thirty days 
they may know whether they are pregnant or not." (Tr. 
127) 
In answer to the question appellee stated that she had 
missed her monthly period which was about two weeks prior 
to June 22nd. Appellants' counsel then renewed his objection 
and moved to strike both the question and ans.wer and the court 
denied the mot~on. (Tr. 128) This left the jury to infer that 
the court was of the opinion that the appellee was pregnant. 
The appellee was a lay witness and as such was not com-
petent to testify as to whether she was pregnant at the time 
of the alleged assault and battery. The rule is well settled that 
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where one's physical condition is of such a character as to re-
quire skilled and professional men to determine the same, the 
question is one of science and must necessarily be determined 
by the testimony of skilled professional persons. In the case 
of Oklaho1na H osp£tal "L'. BroUJn} (Okla.), 208 Pac. 787, the 
court in its opinion said: 
''It is the settled rule that where the injuries com-
plained of are of such a character as to require skilled 
and professional men to determine the cause and extent 
thereof the question is one of science and must neces-
sarily be determined by the testimony of skilled profes-
sional persons." 
In Skidmore v. Oklahoma Hospital) (Okla.) 278 Pac. 
334, the court in its opinion said: 
"It is contended by defendant that the evidence is 
wholly insufficient to establish that the distention of the 
bladder caused the stitches to tear and that the tearing 
of the stitches caused the bladder to fall; that there is 
no expert testimony supporting this theory of plaintiff's 
case. 
"Two physicians testified on behalf of plaintiff-
the physician who performed the operation and another. 
Both physicians testified that in their opinion the dis-
tention of the bladder did not cause the stitches to tear, 
and that the tearing of the stitches was not the cause of 
the falling of the bladder, but that the same was oc-
casioned by natural absorption of the stitches. 
"W·e think, in order to sustain this theory of her 
case, it was necessary that she establish the same by 
expert testimony. In the case of St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. 
Criner, 41 Okl. 256, 137 P. 705, it is said: (Where the 
injuries are of such character as to require skilled and 
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professional men to determine the cause and extent 
thereof., the question is one of science, and must neces-
sarily be determined by the testimony of skilled pro-
fessional persons.,' See, also, A., T. & S. F. Ry. v. Mel-
son, 40 Okl. 1, 134 P. 388, Ann. Cas. 191SD, 760. 
''The rule announced in these cases is well estab-
lished, and, if this were the only element of damages 
sought to be recovered, the judgment of the trial court 
would be correct.'' 
In St. Louis Mining & Smelting Company, et al. v. State 
Industrial Commission, (Okla.) 241 Pac. 170, the court said 
and held: 
"We need not deal at length with the first part of 
the question, for in our judgment the latter part is de-
terminative in this case; that is, ·was the 'accident' the 
cause of the disability? As to the effects of the gas 
upon his person, the claimant was the only one who 
testified in his behalf, and in brief his testimony, in 
substance, was : 
"'I was gassed. I remained at work .with slight 
ill effects, two days thereafter, and am now disabled.' 
uNo one skilled in scientific kno7pledge was brought 
who said that the event of claimant being slightly gassed 
caused his disability. On the other hand, the undis-
puted testimony in the record from the only witness 
qualified to testify concerning the causes and effects of 
internal diseases such as suff·ered by claimant was, in 
substance, that the disability of claimant was caused 
by anthracosis, and solely from such occcupational dis-
ease." * * * 
"We are of the opinion, from a .careful examina-
tion of the record, that the claimant failed to produce 
any competent evidence to form a basis for the finding 
by the commission that the 'accident,' as claimed, re-
sulted in the disability." 
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~-\SSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 13 AND 14 
The appellee in her amended complaint alleged that at 
the time of the assault and battery first "she was pregnant" 
and second that 
"as a result of the injuries inflicted upon her by 
said malicious assault and battery that approximately 
six days thereafter she suffered a miscarriage thereby 
losing her unborn child. * * *." (Tr. 13-D) 
The appellee failed to produce evidence which would justi-
fy either of these questions being submitted to the jury. The 
appellants urgently insist that the court erred in refusing to 
give their requested instruction number 12 which reads as 
follows: 
"The plaintiff in this action has alleged that at 
the time of the alleged assault and battery she was 
pregnant and that as a result of said alleged assault and 
battery she suffered a miscarriage. The court instructs 
you that there is no substantial evidencec that plaintiff 
was pregnant at the time of the alleged assault and 
battery and you are therefore instructed to disregard 
this phase of the case in your deliberations." (Excep-
tion Tr. 252) 
The only evidence tending in any way to show that appellee 
was pregnant at the time of the alleged assault and battery is 
found in appellee's own testimony and in the testimony of 
Doctor Giesy and Doctor Skidmore. The appellee's testimony 
which was made in response to a question asking whether she 
was pregnant on the evening of June 22nd was that she had 
missed her monthly period a little over two weeks prior to that 
time. This testimony, in view of the testimony of Doctor 
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Giesy, gives very little strength to appellee's. contention as Doc-
tor Giesy on cross examination stated that it is not unusual for 
a woman to miss her period without being pregnant and that 
lots of women have irregular menstrual periods.. 
The appellee further stated that 
"Six days after this happened I started to hemor-
rhage and I hemorrhaged continuously up to the first 
of January of this year." (Tr. 129) 
H·ere again the appellee's testimony adds. little to her con-
tention as her own witness, Doctor Giesy, on cross examina-
tion stated that you could not definitely determine the absolute 
cause of the condition which he found in Mrs. Webb and that 
it is almost impossible for any person to give a listing of the 
things that may ,cause a displacement of the uterus because 
there are so many. (Tr. 187, 191) 
Doctor Giesy upon being asked a hypothetical question 
stated, that in his opinion appellee was pregnant on June 22nd. 
(Tr. 179) However, on cross examination Doctor Giesy's 
testimony on this point was weakened considerably as. it ap-
peared that his opinion was based entirely upon probabilities 
and conjecture and that the conditions which he found gave 
rise merely to a probability of pregnancy. (Tr. 189-190) 
The jury in this. case should not have been permitted to 
consider and decide upon a fact where the only ·evidence sup-
porting such fact was based upon mere probability and con-
jecture. 
The court erred further in refusing to give defendants' 
requested instruction number 16 reading as follows: 
"The plaintiff in this action has alleged that at 
the time of the alleged assault and battery she was 
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pregnant and that as a result of said alleged assault 
and battery she suffered a miscarriage. The court in-
structs you that there is no substantial evidence that 
the miscarriage, if any, was caused by or contributed to 
by the alleged assault and battery and you are therefore 
instructed to disregard this phase of the case in your 
deliberations.~, (Exception Tr. 252) 
The appellee alleged and had the burden of proving that 
the alleged miscarriage was suffered uas a result of the injuries 
inflicted upon her by said malicious assault and battery." Evi-
dence which would justify the court in submitting this question 
to the jury is entirely lacking. 
The appellee's only attempt to connect the alleged assault 
and battery up with the fact that six days after she started to 
hemorrhage and suffered a miscarriage was in the hypothetical 
questions put to Doctor Giesy, (Tr. 177 to 180) and Doctor 
Skidmore (Tr. 206 to 209). The answers given by each of 
the doctors are that a blow sufficiently violent to propel appellee 
to the floor would be sufficient to cause a miscarriage. But 
this fact becomes merely a probability as the doctors thereafter 
state that numerous things may cause the conditions from 
which appellee complains. 
With the alleged assault and battery being only one of 
the many things which could cause the conditions complained 
of by appellee, the jury was left entirely . to speculate and 
conjecture as to the cause of these conditions. If there had been 
sufficient evidence to establish the appellee's pregnancy without 
it being based upon mere possibilities, ;conjecture and specula-
tion, the evidence that there was a miscarriage that was caused 
by the assault and battery is much too speculative to justify the 
question being submitted to the jury. 
In Jones et al. v. Pierce et al.) (Louisiana 1935) 162 So. 
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21 5, action was brought to recover damages arising out of an 
automobile accident. Plaintiff contends that she was four or 
five months .pregnant and that as a result of the accident the 
foetus of an unborn child was killed, rendering necessary its 
removal by surgeons. The trial court dismissed the suit and 
made the following statement: 
" '* * * I am not in the slightest degree convinced 
that the slight accident which I have described had 
anything to do with this abortion. At the very best 
it is a mere possibility and in a matter of serious import 
to myself I would not act on it, as I do not believe that 
this accident had anything to do with the abortion.'" 
In affirming the trial court's decision the appellate court 
said and held : 
"The record shows that Mrs. Jones, prior to the 
accident, was a normal, healthy woman, and that she, 
on the night of the accident, had been pregnant for 
about four or five months. She was seated on the front 
sea:t of her husband's car when, in its course across 
St. Charles avenue, it was brought to a stop to permit 
a street car to pass ahead of it. A few feet of the 
rear portion of the car extended into the roadway of 
St. ~Charles avenue, and while it was in this position 
the Pierce car approached. Pierce was. unable tn en-
tirely stop it or to completely avoid striking the rear 
of the Jones car. The result was a blow which pushed 
the Jones car for~ard about one foot, and which 
swerved it sidewise about three feet. Mrs. Jones re-
ceived no external injuries, bruises, or abrasions, and 
there was nothing to indicate to her, or to any one else, 
that she had been in any way injured, except that she 
stated that 'my stomach kept quivering.' Wheri asked 
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whether the impact was a 'terrible blow,' she said, 'No 
-I don't think it was.' She herself also testified that 
it did not physically injure her in any way. She re-
turned to her home and during that night gave no 
indication whatever of having been injured. On the 
next day she reported for her work as a comptometer 
operator, and, according to her testimony, '·worked that 
night until 8 :30,' and even then evidently felt perfectly 
well, because she did not go from her place of employ-
ment to her home, but went to Loyola University to 
wait until her husband, who was a student there, could 
complete his studies at the night school. She then went 
to her home and retired, still without any premonition 
or indication of internal injuries or disorders, and she 
slept until about midnight, when she was awakened by 
the fact that she 'was losing a lot of blood.' She went 
at once to a hospital, and there the physician in charge 
was successful in stanching the flow·. On the next 
morning she returned to her home, and, upon calling at 
the office of her own physician, was examined by him, 
with the result that he found one of the cords protrud.;. 
ing in the vagina, and concluded from this that she 
had 'had an abortion'; that the foetus was dead, and 
that she should 'have the uterus cleaned out at the hos-
pital.' 
''It will be noted that, except for very slight ner-
vous shock at the time of the accident, no ·physical 
injury was sustained, no labor pains commenced, and 
no symptoms of an impending miscarriage manifested 
themselves, and that it was not until about thirty hours 
after the collision that she suffered to any appreciable 
extent. In the meantime, she went about all her duties 
without pain and continued at her work for a full day 
and for a part of the next night. It is unbelievable 
that, had the umbilical cord been severed at the time of 
the accident, there would have been no immediate evi-
dence of that fact. This cord supplies to the foetus 
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the blood and later the nourishment necessary for its 
development and growth, and its severance would, un-
questionably, have produced immediate hemorrhage, 
pain, and suffering." * * * 
"* * * There is no doubt that there are many other 
possible causes for misfortune such as Mrs. Jones sus-
tained. One .doctor testified to these other possible 
ca;uses. We cannot conclude that the district judge was 
in error in deciding that the proof does not show with 
sufficient certainty that the cause was the accident com-
plained of." 
In Edenfield, et al. v. Wheless, et al., (:Louisiana, 1934) 
151 So. 659, action was brought to recover damages alleged to 
have been caused by an automobile accident. Mrs. Edenfield 
at the time of the accident was four and one-half months preg-
nant. The accident occurred on July 25, 1932, and on July 
28, 1932, labor pains came on and a Ccesarean operation was 
performed. The question for determination was whether the 
condition of Mrs. Edenfield was caused from the accident or 
from a kidney condition which existed prior to the accident. 
In affirming a judgrnent of the lower court the appellate court 
said and held : 
" * * * He (Dr. Dickson) was asked if a blow 
could possibly have caused the trouble suffered by Mrs. 
Edenfield, and he replied, 'Yes, possibly.' He was then 
asked if it was a probability in this case, and replied: 
'Well, I do not know. I did not take that into con-
sideration. T did not make a cystoscopic examination.' 
"We have studied with care the testimony of Dr. 
Stamper, who treated Mrs. Edenfield for two and one-
half years, to find where he gives as his opinion that the 
trouble with Mrs. Edenfield after the accident was due 
to the injuries received in the accident, and we have 
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failed to find it. Each of these reputable physicians 
and surgeons treated her before and after the accident. 
Each performed an operation on her, and no doubt 
would be inclined to be as favorable to her cause as 
possible, an.d if they are not wiling to venture a.n 
opinion that the slight in.ju.ry received by her was the 
cause of her trouble thereafter, we think the court would 
have to go a long 7.CJaY to do so. No doubt it is possible 
that the injury could have caused the trouble, but we 
cannot decide cases on possibilities alone. The lower 
court held that the condition of Mrs. Edenfield after 
the accident was not caused by the accident and slight 
injury received there, and we find no manifest error 
in its holding. It rejected the claim of Mr. Edenfield 
and allowed to Mrs. Edenfield damages in the sum of 
$100, for immediate shock on the date of the accident, 
and rejected all other demands. 
"There is no manifest error in the judgment, and 
it is affirmed." 
In Consolidated Coach Corporation v. Garmon_, (Ken-
tucky 1930), 26 S. W. (2d) 20, appellee obtained a judgment 
against appellant for $2,075 for injuries which she claimed she 
received while riding on a bus operated by appellant. In its 
OJ;)inion the court said and held: 
"A more serious question is presented, however, 
by another point urged against the instructions, but not 
pressed with the same vigor as the point just ·disposed 
of. It is insisted that the miscarriage was not shown 
to have been the direct result of the collision. We 
cannot agree with that contention. The evidence was 
sufficient to authorize the jury to determine that it 
resulted from the injury received because of the colli-
sion, and that the injury was the direct cause of the mis-
carriage. The evidence presented a further question 
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of damages which went into the realms of speculation 
and was too remote to be considered as the direct re-
sult of the injury. Appellee claims that the miscarriage 
resulted in iri juries and suffering that may be attributed 
to the miscarriage itself and not to the injury. The 
·evidence does not present facts sufficient to enable a 
jury to determine that the continued suffering and in-
juries resulting from the miscarriage were caused by 
the collision. These may have been occasioned by 
reason of other conditions having rto connection with 
the collision. The physical condition of appellee, the 
treatment she received by the physicians at the time 
of the miscarriage, and care and attention received by 
her after the event, may have been the. cause of the 
continued disorders about which she complains. The 
evidence is sufficient to show that she suffered between 
the time of the accident and until the time of her mis-
carriage, and, of course, the miscarriage resulted in 
certain natural suffering which rna y be traced directly 
to the collision. But the evidence was not such as to 
show that the lingering ailments and disorders which 
continued on down to the trial were the direct rest·tlts 
of the collision. Dr. Johnson, who testified for ap-
pellee, stated that certain pains on the side and certain 
disorders attending the natural functions of appellee 
after the miscarriage were probably attributable to an 
infection following the miscarriage. This evidence was 
objected to and overruled and proper exceptions were 
reserved. There was evidence along this same line given 
by the doctor. He testified that an operation would 
probably be necessary for the removal of some of the 
genital organs. This evidence allowed the jury to find 
for appellee for suffering occasioned by the miscarriage, 
when the disorders were .probably caused, according to 
the doctor, by an infection following the miscarriage. 
This evidence should not have been admitted. It is 
not shown that her suffering growing out of the infec-
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tion was the direct result of the collision. Instead of 
an instruction, as contended for by appellant, limiting 
the recovery to the injuries other than those not di-
rectly connected with the collision, the .court should 
have sustained objections to the evidence relating to 
these sufferings. The instructions, therefore, were 
proper, but incompetent evidence was admitted, and 
that is one of the grounds for a new trial." 
In Ford v. Nicolet al. (Michigan 1933), 246 N. W. 130, 
the court said and held : 
"The testimony did not disclose evidentiary facts. 
The expert had but a theory that plaintiff was sterile 
because she did not become pregnant; that she did not 
become pregnant because of lack of ovulation; that 
lack of ovulation was because of shock to her nervous 
system. Probative evidence must be something more 
tangible than a mere pyramiding of theories. The 'Wit-
ness gave no satisfactory date upon which to base his 
conjectures. The sterility here alleged was too remote 
and speculative, considering the nature of the injuries, to 
warrant the verdict rendered. Incapacity to bear chil-
dren, except occasioned by direct injury to, or disease 
of, sexual organs or reproductive functions, is difficult 
to prove, but cannot be permitted to rest upon con-
jecture of such inability and speculation as to the cause 
of such conjectured inability. We need make no quo-
tations from the expert evidence in contradiction of the 
postulates of the expert called by plaintiff. The evidence 
must show sterility in fact and occasioned by direct 
bodily injuries or the proximate result thereof." 
In Symington v. Graham (Maryland 1933) 169 A. 316 
plaintiff sued to recover damages which she claimed resulted 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
from a collision occurring February 12, 1932. The appellate 
court in reversing the judgment for the plaintiff said and held: 
"The impact of the collision threw the plaintiff 
from the front seat so that her face struck the wind-
shield, and she was thrust forward with her knees 
jammed fast underneath the cowl board of the auto-
mobile. She was momentarily stunned, and her nose 
bled freely from the force of the blow of the windshield, 
but she got out of the automobile, and assisted her 
husband with the defendant, who was unconscious and 
badly injured. After the defendant had been carried 
away to a nearby store, the plaintiff felt nauseated and 
sick and w!alked to a neighboring farm house where 
she stayed until the defendant was removed in an ambu-
lance when the plaintiff went to the store where the doc-
tor examined her to see if there were any bones broken in 
her nose. After this examination, the plaintiff was put 
in an automobile and sent home in a nervous condition. 
Her nose became very much swollen and black to the 
eyes, and she became sore, stiff, and bruised, but had 
no pain until the evening of the day following the 
casualty, when pain, which was more pronounced on 
the right side of the abdomen, began. She stated that 
the manner in which her knees had struck the auto-
mobile had caused the 'jar and the pain through my 
(her) stomach.' She had bruises on both legs which 
were sore, and remained for four weeks before they 
were entirely gone. The plaintiff described these ab-
dominal pains as 'intense stomach pains' which con-
tinued for a period of three or four weeks. She was then 
able to proceed with her household duties. 
"While the severe stomach pains ceased at the end 
of three or four weeks after the injury, she experienced 
slight similar pains until the end of two months after 
the accident. After this period, the pains were suc-
ceeded by an unusual soreness and drawing sensation 
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in the left side which continued until the day she went 
to the hospital on July 3. The plaintiff thus described 
the discomfort : 'The burden seemed too low, and just 
uncomfortable; just a pulling and drawing sensation 
day and night.~ .. * * * 
•(Jn order to prevent imposition it is necessary to 
keep constantly and firmly in view the elementary rule 
that before a plaintiff cau recover it is necessary for 
hinz to sho7.t' a damage naturally and reasonably arising 
from the negligent act. The burden is upon the plain-
tiff to prove that the particular consequence for which 
a pecuniary finding is sought is the direct result of a 
wrongful act or omission by the defendant. The plain-
tiff fails in this burden, although he proves the negli-
gence and the injury, unless he show that the par-
ticular injury would in ordinary course flow from the 
negligence. Abend v. Sieber, 161 Md. 649, 158 A. 
63; Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 40 A. 1067, 41 L. R. 
A. 478; Beven on Negligence (4th Ed.) vol. 1, pp. 
67, 85. 
"The plaintiff has failed in this case to meet this 
burden of proof. The testimony of the doctor, whom 
she called, is clearly to the effect that there is no natural 
and reasonable connection between the accident of Feb-
ruary 12, and the plaintiff's illness and operation of 
July 3. Nor is this connection shown by any other tes-
timony on the record. Conjecture~ speculation~ or mere 
possibility~ must not usurp the place of proof of the 
essential facts in issue if the trial of facts is to remain 
a rational and just procedure. For the error in refusing 
the motion to strike out the testimony with reference 
to the pain, suffering, and distress of the plaintiff at-
tributable to her illness and its resulting operation, and 
in declining to grant the defendant~ s prayers excluding 
these matters from the consideration of the jury in esti-
mating the amount of damages sustained~ the judgment 
must be reversed.~~ 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR BASED ON ADMISSION 
OF EVIDENCE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINAT,ION 
ASSIGNMENT OF ·ERROR NO. 3 
In the third Assignment of Error the appellants insist 
the court erred in permitting counsel ·for appellee to ask Earl 
C·ochran, appellants' witness, on cross-examination over. our 
objection this ques'tion: 
"Now, you have described those duties you have 
in connection with the collection of fares. Is acting 
as a bouncer for the ejection or eviction of people that 
you think should be evicted, also a part of your duties t' 
(Tr. 160) 
The first sentence of the question, "Now, you have described 
those duties you have in connection with the collection of fares.'' 
means nothing because it is merely a statement by counsel of 
what the witness had finished doing. It does emphasize, how-
. ever, that counsel had in mind to unfairly discredit the witness 
before the jury when he next said 
"Is acting as a bouncer for the. ejection or eviction 
of people that you think should be evicted also a part 
of Y?Ur duties?" 
This statement, first, is an open attempt on the part of 
counsel to embarrass the witness before the jury in that counsel 
injects into the picture a rough situation such as a bar-room 
or the like, where the "bouncer" is a required part of the 
equipment. 
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Second, it assumes that appellants maintained such a place 
and that a "bouncer" was necessary and that this boy was of 
such a character, that he would act as a bouncer. 
Third, the statement assumes that as such "bouncer" he 
could eject or evict people whom he thought ought to be 'thrown 
out regardless of who they were or what they were doing. 
There was no evidence in the record which would warrant 
any inference that appellants employed anyone to act as bouncers 
in and about the giant racer, and particularly that this witness 
was employed for any such purpose. Neither is there anything 
in the record that the appellants employed anyone to eject or 
evict people that they "think should be evicted," or that this 
particular witness was so employed. The record shows upon 
its face that the sole and only reason for asking this question 
was to prejudice the mind of the jury against the appellants. 
That it is error for counsel on cross-eXiamination to ask 
questions on such entirely· collateral issues in an attempt to 
humiliate the witness and to assume facts such as were assumed 
here is clearly established by the following cases : 
Johnson vs. Richards, ('Idaho) 294 Pac. 507, where the 
court gave: 
"The court properly sustained an objection to the 
following question asked respondent on cross-examina-
tion: 'Isn't it a fact that by reason of the financial con-
dition of your husband and the troubles over your ex-
travagances, that suits were instituted against him 
here?' The question assumed there was trouble over 
rrespondent' s extravagances, as to which there was no 
evidence. It was .duplicitous and not proper cross-ex-
amination. For like reasons the court did not err in 
sustaining objections to the following question: 'At 
that time and prior thereto, you had serious quarrels 
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covering a long period of time, by reason of and on 
account of your attempting to poison him, didn't you?' " 
Annarina vs.. Boland, (Md.) 111 Atl. 84: 
"The fifth exception relates to the action of the 
court in refusing to permit the same witness to be asked 
on cross-examination if he did not live at his mother's 
home with the woman he married, before he married 
her. Such testimony was entirely collateral to any 
issue in the case and did not bear in any way on the 
credibility of the witness and its only possible purpose 
was to degrade and humiliate him, and for that purpose 
it was inadmissible. Avery v. State, 121 Md. 236, 88 
Atl. 148, and the question was properly refused. The 
same witness was later asked if his father had not sworn 
out a peace warrant against his mother. The court very 
properly refused to permit this question, and its ruling 
is the· subject of the sixth exception. Even if the fact 
sought to be proved were relevant, that was not the 
way in which to prove it." 
Essex vs. Millikan, et al~ (Ind.) 164 N. E. 284: 
"Appellees' objection to this question was sus-
tained. This. ruling is claimed to be reversible error. 
The question assumes facts not covered b~ the direct 
testimony of the witness, but in conflict with the direct 
and positive testimony of the witness. The question 
assumes a copy of the lease in question had once been 
in the possession of Williams, and that, through some 
manner, had thereafter gotten into the possession of the 
witness. There is no claim that Exhibit 1 was ever in 
the possession of Williams or that appellant ever parted 
with its possession. As was said in Pennsylvania Co. 
v. Newm.eyer, 129 Ind. 401, 28 N. E. 860, quoting 
from Starkie. on Evidence: 'Although upon cross-ex-
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amination a counsel may put leading questions, those 
questions must not assume facts to have been proved 
which have not been proved, or tha't particular answers 
have been given contrary to the facts.' There was no 
reversible error in the action of the court in sustaining 
the objection.'' 
See also the rule as stated in the following cases : 
Cristofaro v .. Brenfleck, 184 A. (N. J.) 619, point ( 5); 
Maloney v. Carey, 9 A. (2d) (N. J.) 791, point (3); 
Bradburn Motors Co. v. Moverman, (R.I.) 7 A. (2d) 
207, point ( 5). 
It is also error to assume in a question as it is here as-
sumed, thaf there was some duty upon the appellants which 
did not exist either as a matter of law or as shown by the facts. 
Wise v. Schneider, (Ala.) 88 So. 662: 
"Where a statute or ordinance has prescribed the 
duties of persons who are driving vehicles over high-
ways, with respect to the safety of other vehicles or 
persons, it is proper for the trial judge to instruct the 
jury as to the legal duties thus imposed. But it was 
not proper to ask defendants' witness Newsome, who 
was in the car, but not driving it, 'Don't you know, as 
a driver of a car, that it is your duty to keep to the 
right when turning a corner,' and 'to keep close to the 
right when turning a corner?' The question assumes 
the existence of a duty not prescribed by any statute, 
nor hy any municipal ordinance of Cullman, so far 
as appears, and it was not within the legitimate range 
of a general cross-examination of the witness." 
From the foregoing and from the size of the verdict in 
this case it is certain that the court erred in overruling our 
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objection to the question first hereinabove set out and that the 
error warrants a reversal of this judgment. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 4 AND 5 
Appellants have assigned as errors number 4 and number 
5 the court's over-ruling of their objections to the hypothetical 
questions propounded to appellee's witness, Doctor Giesy, and 
appellants' witness, Doctor Skidmore. Appellants assign these 
errors on the same grounds that were argued at the time the 
questions were asked, namely, that the questions contain state-
ments of fact which were not supported by the evidence and 
that the facts were colored and exaggerated to the extent that 
they were misleading. The courts have held that questions 
propounded in such a manner should be excluded. 
The rule is clearly stated in Wingfield v. McClintock, et al., 
(Kan.) 116 Pac. 488, at page 489, as follows: 
"Each party had a right to propound hypothetical 
questions upon his own theory of what the evidence 
tended to prove, provided such questions contained no 
1naterial exaggeration or perversion of facts assumed. 
It is said in Commercial Travelers v. Barnes, 75 Kan. 
720, 90 Pac. 293: 'Hypothetical questions put to ex-
pert witnesses should be based upon such facts only as 
the evidence tends to prove, and if, as to any material 
hypothesis, such question is without the support of evi-
dence, it should be excluded. It may not be required 
that the question be based upon conceded facts, nor 
that it embrace all the facts of which there is evidence,; 
neither is technical accuracy required in the framing of 
the question, but no material exaggeration or perversio• 
of facts assumed is permissible." 
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Certainly it was an exaggeration of the evidence when 
appellee's counsel stated in propounding the hypothetical ques-
tions that "she was struck a blow of sufficient force to cause her 
to sit down z,;olently * * * " (Tr. 177), and, "she was propelled 
violently to the floor at the place she was standing." (Tr. 206) 
The trial judge in allowing the questions to stand in the 
face of defendants' objections would give the jury the im-
pression that he believed the evidence to be as stated in the 
questions. 
IV 
ASSIGNl\IENTS OF ERROR BASED UPON REFUSAL 
TO GIVE APPELLANTS' REQUES·TED 
INSTRUCTIONS 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6 
From the evidence of the witnesses for appellants it -is 
clear that Jack Lampere was just standing at the time the 
plaintiff came up from behind and struck him full in the face. 
Under such evidence the appellants were entitled to an in-
struction setting out their rights under such conditions. 
Request Number 3 did that very thing, but it, nor nothing 
like it) was given to the jury. 
The request set out under Assignment Number 6 reads 
as follows: 
"The court instructs the jury that defendants' 
employee was the best judge of what was necessary to 
defend himself against the attack of plaintiff and of 
the means to be used for his own protection. When the 
defendants' employee was attacked he was obliged to 
exercise his best judgment at that time as to what he 
should do in his own defense and his judgment is one 
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which, if honestly and reasonably exercised, is con-
trolling. It is absolutely controlling unless you find 
that his exercise of it at the time and under t}le circum-
stances, was such an exercise as was unreasonable under 
all the evidence in the case. So, if you find that from 
the nature of the assault committed upon defendants' 
employee by plaintiff he had a right to think he was 
being attacked by a person it was necessary for him to 
defend himself against, and in so acting his hand came 
in contact with plaintiff, without thought on his part 
that it might be a woman, then the plaintiff cannot 
recover in this action." 
This request was approved as an instruction in the case 
of Kent v. Cole (Mich.) 48 N. W. 168, and is given as a pattern 
in 3 ·Re!d's B:ranson Instructions to Juries 96. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 7 
The appellants, on their theory of what happened when 
the appellee struck Jack Lampere, requested the court to in-
struct the jury as set out in Request No. 4. The court refused 
and did not cover the point invoked by any instruction given. 
The request reads : 
"You are instructed that the defendants' employee 
had a right to protect himself against an assault by 
plaintiff. If you find that plaintiff assaulted defendants' 
employee in such a manner and under such conditions 
as to naturally excite an ordinarily careful and prudent 
man in the pla:ce of said employee under the same cir-
cumstances and conditions, then the said employee can-
not be held to the greatest nicety in the calculation of 
the amount of force which he should use; and even if 
he did use more force than was necessary, still if under 
the circumstances he acted as an ordinarily careful and 
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prudent man under the influence of plaintiff's conduct, 
as you find it to be, would have acted under the same 
circumstances and conditions, then you should find in 
favor of the defendants-'no cause of action.' " 
That the law set out in this request is correct and that 
appellants were entitled to such instruction see 
3 Reid's Branson, 98 and 99, under paragraph 8; 
Swinney ·v. Wright (Ga.) 132 S. E. 228-9; 
In the case of Armuleuis v. Koblitz (Ohio) 150 N. E~ 
620, the court said : 
''The charge was not a model in wording, but, in 
substance, it was to the effect that, if the evidence 
showed, and the jury believed, that the plaintiff, Ko-
blitz, came to the home of the defendant Joseph Ar-
muleuis and while there caused a disturbance, and that 
the defendant Joseph Armuleuis repeatedly requested 
Koblitz to leave his home, and Koblitz repeatedly re-
fused to go, and continued to conduct himself in the 
same disturbing manner, the defendant was justified in 
using such force as was necessary to eject the plaintiff 
from his house, and the law does not closely, nor nicely, 
measure the force which the defendant used to effect 
that purpose. This request to charge was refused. This 
constituted reversible error. Chesrown v. Bevier, 101 
Ohio St. 282, 128 N. E. 94; p·ayne, Direc'tor General, 
v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N. E. 85. 
"Th~ judgm.ent must therefore be reversed." 
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO. 9 
Appellants' third attempt to get the court to give some 
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instruction on their theory of this particular phase of the case 
is represented by its Request No. 6 reading: 
If you find from all the evidence that plaintiff 
struck defendants' employee when said employee was 
not expecting such an assault and said employee had 
reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that· it 
was necessary to pro'tect himself and in protecting him-
self he turned quickly and struck plaintiff but used no 
more force or violence than to him honestly and reason-
ably appeared necessary to repel a threatening injury, 
'then under such cir.cumstances the defendants' em-
ployee did no wrong and plaintiff has no right to recover 
damages in this case.'' r 
Certainly the foregoing request is closely tied in to the evi-
dence and sufficiently states the law covering the facts in evi-
dence. 
The rule of law set out in headnote No. 2 of Chesrown 
v. Bevier (Ohio) 128 N. E. 94 clearly shows that error was 
committed by the court in not instructing on the phases of the 
case covered by the three requests last hereinabove set out. 
The statement in the case last above set out is this: 
"Upon a written request to charge before argu-
ment, if the request correctly states the law and is per-
tinent to one or more of the issues of the case and the 
same subject has not been covered by other charges 
:given before argument, it is error to refuse to give 
such charge before argument, even though the language 
of the charge is not the exact language the court would 
have selected." 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 8 
The evidence is clear that the appellants were the owners 
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of and operated the giant racer. They therefore had the 
right to determine the manner in which the cars should be op-
erated and had at the time in question, through their servants, 
elected not to operate the east side of the tracks or the green cars. 
Appellants' evidence shows that their employees had several 
times requested Bettilyon to leave the east platform and go over 
to the west side. (Tr. 234-5) If Bettilyon refused to leave the 
east platform after being requested to do so by appellants' 
employees. then he became a 'trespasser and the employees had 
the right to use such reasonable force as. was necessary to re-
move him from the premises. Very substantial evidence shows 
that Mr. Bettilyon refused to leave the east platform. The 
evidence further shows that his attitude was one of resistance 
and that at the very first he was the aggressor and in spite of 
the effort of the appellants' employee he "swung" at him and 
the fight was on. (Tr. 80-81) The same attitude exhibited by 
Mr. Bettilyon was exhibited by Mr. Webb even after the entire 
affair was over. He says he went out to organize to go back 
for more. ( Tr. 46) 
If Bettilyon were a trespasser, or if he were the aggressor 
in the affray which ensued, then appellee in leaving a place of 
safety and interceding in the affray had no more rights or im-
munities than did Bettilyon, and appellants were entitled to have 
these propositions submitted to the jury as se't forth in appel-
lants' requested Instruction Number 5, which is assigned as 
Error N wnber 8. The requested Instruction reads as follows : 
"You are instruc'ted that these defendants have 
the full right to determine the operation of the scenic 
racer and that they, through their servants, having de-
termined not to operate the east set of tracks or green 
cars, then Bernard L. B·ettilyon had no right to go on 
that side of the racer platform. You are further in-
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structed that having gone on the east side if you find 
that his being there did in any way interfere with or 
cause trouble to defendants' servants in their operation 
of the racer that the servants of defendants had a lawful 
right to use such reasonable force as was necessary, 
after requesting Bernard L. Bettilyon to leave that part 
of defendants' property, to remove him from the place 
in question. You are also instructed that if in using 
force to remove said B·ernard L. Bettilyon that he at-
tempted to or did start to fight or hit the servant or 
servants of defendants and as a result of such assault 
or attempted assault the said Bernard L. Bettilyon 
was later injured, and that thereafter this plaintiff's 
husband voluntarily came into the fight and that later 
this plaintiff herself left a place of safety and slapped 
defendants' employee in the face, as a result of which 
plaintiff was struck by said employee, then plaintiff 
cannot recover in this case and your verdict will be 
for the defendants, and ·each of 'them, 'no cause of 
action.' " (Exception Tr. 251) 
The requested instruction clearly states a theory of the 
case relied on by appellants and the trial court erred in refusing 
to give the instruction or a similar instruction that would pre-
sent to the jury the appellants' defense. 
In 6 C. !. Sec. at pages 815 and 816 the rule is stated as 
follows: 
a A person interfering on ano-ther's behalf enjoys 
no further immunity than the person attacked. Hence, 
both must be free from fault in bringing on the diffi-
culty, the apparent danger must be such as to induce 
one exercising a reasonable and proper judgment to 
interfere to prevent a consummation of the injury, the 
force employed should not be more than appears to be 
reasonably necessary, the reasonableness thereof to be 
judged by the situation as it reasonably appeared to 
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defendant at the time of the assault. ~V hen the danger 
is 01.'erj justification for the use of violence is at an 
end. * * * 
"Since, however, the person interfering on behalf 
of another enjoys no further or greater immunity than 
the person attacked, as stated supra in subdivision a 
of this section, defendant not only must be free from 
fault himself, but there must also be freedom from 
fault on the part of the person he seeks to protect. Ac-
co·rdingly, if the person defended was not free from 
fault, his protector cannot claim intmunity. Further-
1nore, before a person is justified in using force to pro-
tect ntembers of his family, the apparent danger must 
be such as to induce one exercising a reasonable and 
proper judgment to interfere to prevent a consumma-
tion of the injury, and no more force must be used than 
is reasonably necessary for such purpose.· If the danger 
has passed justification for the use of violence is at an 
end." 
The same rule is clearly announced in the case of Morris 
'lJ. McClellan (Ala.) 45 So. 641, at page 645, as follows: 
uwhere one, standtng in the relation that authorizes 
him under the law to strike in the protection of another, 
is sued for an assault and battery for striking in protec-
tion of such other one, and undertakes to set up justifica-
tion in defense of the action, there must not only be 
freedom from fault on the part of the person he sought 
to protect_. but freedom from fault on his own part, as 
well as a necessity to commit the battery." 
In Roberson v. Stokes, et al (N. C. 106 S.E. 151, action 
for assault and battery was brought by the plaintiff against W. 
G. Stokes and another. The verdict was against the plaintiff 
and from the judgment entered thereon plaintiff appealed. The 
appellate court in granting a new trial said and held : 
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"It was erroneous to charge the jury as set forth 
in the above statement of the case for two reasons: 
( 1) It was based upon the assumption that .defendants' 
version of the assault" was the correct one, whereas there 
was evidence that defendants were tn the wrong 
throughout, and the jury therefore had the law stated 
to them with only a partial and contracted view of the 
evidence. This method of charging. a jury has been 
disapproved by us. Where a phase of the evidence is 
presented to the jury, both contentions in regard to it 
should be given; otherwise it might cause the jury to 
give undue weight and significance to the one stated. 
The very question was discussed in Jarrett v. Trunk 
Co., 144 N. C. 299, 56 S. E. 937, where it was said that, 
although it be not error generally to refrain from giv-
ing instructions. unless asked to do so, yet care must 
be taken when the judge thinks proper to instruct the 
jury upon a phase of the evidence and to expound the 
law in relation thereto, not only to state it correctly, 
but to state the law as applicable to the respective con-
tentions of each party upon such phase of the evidence. 
Having undertaken to tell the jury how they should 
answer that V.Ssue if they found such· facts according to 
plaintiff's contention, it was manifestly incumbent upon 
the court to state the defendants' contentions in respect 
to such phase of the evidence and to instruct the jury 
how to answer the issue should they sustain such con-
tention. State v. Austin, 79 N.C. 626; Burton v. Rail-
road, 84 N. C. 197; Bynum v. Bynum, 33 N. C. 636; 
State v. Wolf, 122 N. C. 1081, 29 S. E. 841. 
"The phase mentioned by his honor was flatly 
denied by the plaintiff, and a very different complexion 
given to it by him. The judge's illustration, based, as 
it was, on the assumption that plaintiff was the sole 
aggressor, and that W. G. Stokes did nothing to bring 
on the fight, but was illegally assaulted by the plaintiff 
and knocked down, was not justified by the evidence, as 
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there was plenty of evidence to show that it was not 
true, but that the defendants were the aggressors, W. 
G. Stokes having attempted lto attack the plaintiff with 
a brick, and that the latter acted in self-defense, and 
that the other defendant wrongfully and unlawfully 
joined in the attack upon him, having no just or legal 
ground for his intervention, which was simply voluntary 
and gratuitous on his part. It was therefore required, 
under the principle stated in Jarrett v. Trunk Co., 
supra, and the ·cases therein cited, that the judge should 
have stated both sides of .the evidence bearing on that 
particular phase. Such an instruction was peculiarly 
required, under the circumstances of this case, and the 
incompleteness of the one given, in the respect indicat-
ed, may have turned the scales against the plaintiff, and 
probably did. What the judge did say afterwards was 
not sufficient to cure the error. * * * " 
"The son could do only what his father could 
rightfully do, and must be judged by his rights and 
responsibilities, 'because,' as Hale said, 'they are in a 
mutual relation one to another.' The jury must find 
the facts, including the necessity of intervention by the 
son, and whether he kept within his privilege." 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 10 
Appellants' Assignment of Error Number 10 is that the 
court erred in refusing to give their requested Instruction N um-
ber 7, which reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that Bernard L. Bettilyon had 
no right to be on the east or green car side of the plat-
form in question without the consent of defendants. 
So, if you find that he, ibeing on that side without right, 
refused to leave the east side of said platform when so 
requested by defendants' servants and that said servants 
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then went to said Bernard L. Bettilyon at his dare and 
invitation to induce him to vacate the east side of said 
platform, and that as a result of the effort of defen-
dants' servants to induce him to leave that part of de-
fendants' premises the said Bernard L. Bettilyon, while 
said servants were in the exercise of only such reason-
able force as was necessary to remove plaintiff, struck 
at defendants' servant and started to fight as a result 
of which he suffered some injury, then the plaintiff in 
this case cannot justify herself in leaving a place of 
safety and committing an assault upon the employee 
of these defendants and therefore plaintiff cannot re-
cover in this case and your verdict must be for the de-
fendants, and ea·ch of them, and against the plaintiff-
'no cause of action.'" (Exception Tr. 251-252) 
The request embodies substantially the same elements as 
appellants' Request Number 5 and could have been given in 
lieu of that instruction to present appellants' defense to the 
action. The refusal to give either of the requests or to cover 
the proposition contained therein by any other instruction is 
obviously reversible error. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 11 
Appellants have assigned as error Number 11 the trial 
court's refusal to give their requested Instruction Number 8, 
which is as follows : 
"You are instructed that the lawful owner or oc-
cupant of premises may rightfully restrict the use of 
his premises to his business guests and this he may do 
by word of mouth a well as by erecting signs or bar-
ricades or by using other means of giving notice of the 
restricted use. If a business .guest refuses to quit a 
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restricted portion of the owner's or occupant's premises 
after verbal request so to do, and reasonable opportunity 
has been given him to depart, he thereby becomes a 
trespasser and may be ejected by the use of such reason-
able force as is necessary under the circumstances. So, 
in this case, if you find the acts of which the plaintiff 
complains arose out of the use of such force on the 
part of the employees of the defendants or an exercise 
on their part of the right to defend themselves against 
attack by 1\Ir. Bettilyon, then plaintiff cannot recover in 
this action." (Exception Tr. 252) 
The principle of law relied on by appellants in this re-
quested instruction is clearly stated in 6 C.!. Sec'. at pages 819 
and 820, as follows: 
"Reasonable force rna y be used to prevent a tres-
pass on one's property or to eject a trespasser or in-
truder thereon. 
"A lawful owner or occupant of premises, or one 
claiming title and rightfully in possession, may retain 
possession and use such force as rna y be reasonably 
necessary to prevent an unlawful entry, or to remove 
trespassers or intruders, or persons, originally on the 
premises by license or permission, who refuse to leave 
on request, and are given a reasonable time in which to 
do so, * * * . " 
In Johnson v. Huntsman, 60 Utah, 402; 209 Pac. 197, at 
page 201, the Supreme Court of Utah cites with approval the 
rule stated in 2 R. C. L. at page 559, a:s follows: 
"It is a well-settled principle that the occupant of 
any house, , store, or other building has the legal right 
to control it, and to admit whom he pleases to enter 
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and remain !there, and that he also has the right to expel 
from the room or building any one who abuses the 
privilege which has been thus given him. Therefore, 
while the entry by one person on the premises of another 
may be lawful, by reason of express or implied invita-
tion to enter, his failure to depart} on the request of 
the owner will ma;ke him a trespasser} and justify the 
owner in using reasonable force to eject him.JJ 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 12 
As previously pointed out in this brief it is appellants' 
theory, sustained by their evidence, that at least two times after 
the fracas started that it came to an end, and was then started 
again either by appellee's brother Lou or by herself without any 
real cause. 
There is no question but what Bernard Lynch (Slim) came 
into the affray. All the witnesses saw him there, although 
appellee's witnesses do not ascribe to him. his doing what he and 
appellants' witnesses s3lid that he did in trying to end the af-
fair. His testimony as to what he saw and did in connection 
with the affair is as follows : 
That the first time he saw Earl Cochran and Mr. Betti-
lyon, Earl was standing in the pit motioning for Mr. Bettilyon 
to go out. At that time Bernard was going out of the aisle 
that the unloaded passengers from the west side of the cars 
followed to get out. The next time he saw Earl he was on the 
platform with Mr. Bettilyon, trying to push him· toward the 
front. (Tr. 224) They started scuffling and fighting there 
and 
"I saw Mr. Webb coming down the same side 
toward them and so I ,climbed over the fence at about 
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point 'D' and went around on that side to see where 
they were. At that time Earl, Mr. Bettilyon, Mr. 
Webb and Jack were there together. I took hold of 
Mr. Bettilyon's arm from the back and tried to turn 
him around and take him out. I said if they wanted 
him to get out of there he had better get out. I tried 
to take him down toward the opening marked 'P.' ~I 
took him a few feet and he wrenched loose from me 
and went back in to where they were scuffling. (Tr. 
225) When he wrenched loose from me and went 
back in there I started towards him and just then Mr. 
Lampere hit him and he fell down on the floor. During 
the time I was holding him there was no one right 
around us then. They were down quite a few feet 
further than that." (Tr. 226) 
With this evidence, which was also the evidence of ap-
pellants' other witnesses, before the court, we submitted to the 
court our request Number 9 reading as follows : 
"You are instructed that if you find from the evi-
dence that when Bernard Lynch went into the trouble 
going on at the place in question here the altercation 
was brought to a stop by his taking hold of Mr. Betti-
lyon and attempting to get him away from the trouble 
and that Mr. Bettilyon then broke away from him and 
charged at Jack Lampere, who at that time in self-
defense struck Mr. Bettilyon, that then Mr. Bettilyon 
was the aggressor; and if you further find that Mr. 
Webb was still in the altercation along with Mr. Betti-
lyon then I instruct you that plaintiff had no right to 
leave a place of safety, go up to Mr. Lampere and strike 
him·, and that she cannot recover in this action against 
these defendants." (Exception Tr. 252) 
The court refused to give said request and in his instruc-
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tions as given to the jury did not cover the point in any way. 
That appellants were entitled to such an instruction is sustained 
by the following cases: 
3 Reid's Bra:nson Inst. 106 Sec. 753. 
In Miller v. Trascher (La.) 145 So. 27, young Miller 
threw a rock and struck defendant's son, then went over and 
sat down. Trascher senior struck young Miller. · The latter 
through his parents sued Trascher. The court in sustaining 
judgment for Miller says that no further attack by Miller 
seemed evident therefore the blow by Trascher was not justi-
fied. 
Clearly here the evidence shows that if Lou Betti lyon 
had followed out "Slim's" directions there would have been no 
further action, and no excuse for appellee striking Jack as she 
did. Appellants were entitled to have this issue submitted to 
the jury. 
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO. 15 
The assignment s'tates that the court erred in failing and 
refusing to instruct on appellants' theory of their defense. We 
have pointed out above the requests made of the court for in-
structions on appellants' defenses, all of which were refused. 
Now we will consider the instructions given by the court. 
Instructions Nos. 1 and 2 (Tr. 39-40) cover the pleadings. 
Instruction No. 3 (appellee's request) (Tr. 4) defines ab-
stractly assault and battery. Instruction No. 4 (appellee's re-
quest) (Tr. 42) says plaintiff was a gue·st at Saltair for the 
entire evening. Instruction No. 5 (appellee's request) (Tr. 
43) says if appellee was apprehensive of bodily harm to husband 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57 
or brother she was justified in entering the affray, and i £ ren-
dered unconscious her participation would not prevent recovery. 
Instruction No.6 (Tr. 44) says one may protect members 
of his or her family provided danger appears. 
Instruction No. 7 (appellee's request) (Tr. 45) instructs 
as to pregnancy and miscarriage. 
Instruction No.8 (appellants' request) (Tr. 46) instructs 
that only three of the appellants' employees were mixed up in 
the affray. 
Instruction No. 9 (appellants' request) (Tr. 47) is re-
petitious of No. 6, setting out conditions under which appellee 
was justified in entering combat. 
Instructions No. 10 and 11, (Tr. 47-48) are as to damages 
and the balance of the instructions ( Tr. 49) are the regular 
form instructions usually given iby the court. 
In all our experience in trial work over 30 years we have 
never had a case where the court has so absolutely failed to 
instruct on the issues involved. · The case to begin with was 
complicated and in order to afford the appellants any considera-
tion by the jury the defenses of the appellants as established by 
evidence should have been called to the attention of the jury. 
For the court to have so completely failed to give place to 
appellants' defenses and theories requires without question a 
reversal of the judgment entered in this case. 
In Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co.J 57 Utah 7, 169 
Pac. 868, the court said: 
"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his theory, 
when there is evidence to sustain it, submitted to the 
jury and the judgment of the jury on the facts tending 
to support such theory, assuming always that there is 
testimony offered to support the same, and this court 
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has so held in Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah, 121, 
124 Pac. 522, where, speaking through Straup, J., it 
is said: 
"'There are two parties to a lawsuit. Each, on a 
submission of the case to the jury, is entitled to a sub-
mission of it on his theory and the law in respect there-
of. The defendant's theory as to the cause of the ac-
cident is embodied in the proposed requests. There is 
some evidence, as we have shown, to render them ap-
plicable to the case. That is not disputed. We think 
the ·Court's refusal to charge substantially as requested 
was error. That the ruling was prejudicial and works 
a reversal of the judgment is self-evident and unavoid-
able·.' '' 
This rule is restated and approved in M orga.n v. Bingham 
Stage Lines Co. et al, 75 Ut. 87, 283 Pac. 160. 
v. 
ERRORS BASED UPON INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
TO· JURY 
The next series of Assignments go to the errors made by 
the court in the instructions which he gave to the jury. 
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO. 16 
There is no question in the evidence that the appellee and 
party paid their way into Saltair, nor is there any conflict about 
Saltair and the Racer being under separate ownership and op-
eration. It appears affirmatively in the record that for one to 
ride the racer he must pay a fee in addition to the entrance 
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fee to Saltair. Now in the face of such a record the court gave 
as its instruction No. 4 appellee's request, reading: 
"The court instructs you, if you find from. the evi-
dence that the .plaintiff's admission to Saltair Beach 
was paid, that she was a guest and had a right to remain 
there as long as said resort remained open to the public 
that evening." (Exception Tr. 246) 
Clearly the evidence did not warrant such an instruction. 
The jury, to give the court any credit for trying to say some-
thing relevant to the issues involved, must have understood the 
court to say that the appellee and her party having paid their 
way into Saltair were guests for the night on the Racer regard-
less of what happened or their actions in and about the Racer. 
Such an instruction is most dangerous and gave the jury excuse 
for speculation on points that are not involved in the case at 
all. In this case there can be little doubt but that it worked 
to the prejudice of the appellants. 
This court in State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollings-
head, 82 Utah 416, 22 Pac. (2d) 612, in setting out what an in-
struction should present said : 
"It is necessary, however, that whatever theories 
are presented by pleadings or otherwise, in order to be 
entitled to be submitted by way of instructions to the 
jury, some evidence must have been received by the 
court in support of such theory. Instructions to a jury 
must be responsive to the issues and of such nature that 
they are applicable to the evidence received and sub-
mitted to the jury. * * * 
"It is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as 
to the law applicable to the eVidence of the particular 
case, having reference to the parties thereto." 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ·ERROR N·OS. 17 AND 18 
On the appellee's theory, that she had a right to leave a place 
of safety and step out when all things were at rest, and say to 
Jack Lam·pere, "You can't do that," and strike him. full in the 
face, and recover from appellants damages because he in some 
way struck her, the court gave the appellee's request as in-
struction No. 5 which read : 
"The court instructs you if you find from the evi-
dence that the plaintiff was apprehensive that her hus~ 
band and brother, or either of them, were in danger of 
bodily harm, and that she interceded in the affray in 
order to try to protect either or both of them, that she 
was justified. in doing so. If you further find from 
the evidence that as a result of her participation in the 
affray she was rendered unconscious by a blow from one 
of the defendants' employees, the mere fact that she 
participated in the affray would not bar her from re-
covering damages from the defendants." (Exception 
Tr. 246) 
We excepted to the instruction as a whole and then broke 
it down into two parts and excepted to each part. Our excep ... 
tions are covered by the two assignments set out above. 
Dividing the instruction into two parts, what does it say? 
1. The jury is told that if they "find from the evidence 
that the plaintiff was apprehensive tha:t her husband and brother 
or either of them were in danger of bodily ha·rm, and that she 
interceded in the affray in order to try to protect either or both 
of them, 'that she was justified." 
The one big defect in this instruction is that it assumes that 
appellee's husband and brother were being unlawfully assaulted 
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and that therefore the ·only question is as to her apprehension 
concerning them. The evidence in this case goes both ways if 
appellee's evidence is interpreted in her favor. Under appel-
lants' evidence her relatives were the aggressors and under the 
law she could be in no better position than they. Morris v. 
M cClellanJ supra. For the court to leave out a submission of 
the issue on all the evidence and to have made the assumption 
which is made is prejudicial and constitutes reversible error. 
2. The jury is told that if they find from the evidence "that 
as a result of her participation in the affray she was rendered 
unconscious by a blow from one of the defendants' employees, 
the mere fact that she participated in the affray would not bar 
her from recovering damages.'' 
Here again is the basi-c assumption that appellee's relatives 
were rightfully in the affray, and consequently that she was in 
the same position. The appellants' position in the case was 
entirely forgotten and was never in any instruction submitted 
to the jury. Our evidence established appellee as the aggressor, 
and that theory should have gone to the jury. 6 Corpus Juris 
Sec. supra. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 19 
Instruction No. 6 reads as follows : 
"A person is justified in using sufficient force to 
prot~ members of his or her family, provided the ap-
parent danger is such as to induce one exercising a 
reasonable and proper judgment to interfere to prevent 
a consummation of the injury." (Tr. 246) 
Here again the jury is told, without limitation that, apply-
ing the instruction to the appellee, regardless of the right or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
62 
Wtohg of her relatives or herself she had a right to interfere 
in the altercation in question. Certain it is, with all the emphasis 
on this point the j uty was thoroughly mislead as to the res pee• 
tive tights of the patties irt this e<tse. In po .other way can the 
result obtained here be acc·ounted for. The verd.ic~ was most 
excessive. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 20.AND 21 
' . 
. Here our exceptions go to Instruction. No. 7 as a ~hole and 
to its two separate parts. Taken as a whole we find . t~is is 
what the jury was told: 
"The court instructs you that if you believe from 
the evidence, that the plaintiff was .pregnant at the 'time 
she w,as rendered unconscious by the blow delivered by 
·one of the defendants~ employees. 
"And as a result ot said blow and being knocked 
to the floor she suffered a miscatriag~ and thereby the 
loss of her unborn ·Child you may award her monty 
damages for the loss of said unborn child." 
And as we read the instruction and . as it would most 
probably be understood by the j uty the ~ourt instructed the 
JUry: 
If yoti beiieve frotn the ~vidence .that. ap~llee was preg-
nant (\vhen) at the time she was rendered unconscious by u the 
blow" delivered by one of the defendant~ employees, and as 
a result of said blow an.d being knocked to the floor she suffered 
(what) a miscarriage and thereby the loss ·of her unborn child, 
then she can recover her damage for the "lo~s of said unborn 
child.'' 
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In other words, the court~ without reference to the disputed 
facts in evidence, has peremptorily instructed the jury as to 
the actcual existence of four sets of facts which are shown by 
the evidence to be in great dispute. They are : 
· 1. That she was rendered unconscious, 
2. By athe blow" delivered by one of the defendants' em-
ployees, 
3. That as a result of said blow., and 
4. Being knocked to the floor. 
The very sequence of the facts as to which the court in-:-
structed the jury are so closely tied up to the appellee's conten-
tion that the jury could not help but believe that the court meant 
to tell them that those were all the facts that had any bearing 
on the issues. 
. ' 
. Certainly such instruction was gross error on the part of 
the court and exceedingly unfair to the appellants. 
The nature of this case being predicated upon alleged 
assault and battery is very like a crim-inal case wherein the 
personal element is particularly present and the minds of the 
jury are likely ·to be inflamed as a result of anything that is 
said indicating that there was malice or viciousness in what 
was done. For this reason the rule laid down by this court 
·in State v. Seymour., 49 Utah 285, 163 Pac. 789; is particularly 
in point. In that case the court says: 
"The charge is, however, faulty for another rea-
son. The court, in that portion of the charge we have 
copied . above, assumed a very material fact to exist as 
appears from the words we have italicized. 
"The same vice, while not so pronounced, is also 
'found in other portions of the charge, to which it will, 
however. not be necessary to refer, for the reason that 
the error will not occur again. 
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ful not to assume any material fact or facts. Jurors, 
who are laymen, are always eager to follow the opinion 
or judgment of the court, and if the court assumes any 
material fact in the charge, the jurors are most likely 
to follow the assumptions of the court. Indee.d, we must 
assume that such is the case unless the record clearly 
shows the contrary." 
This court again reaffirms this doctrine in State v. Hannah, 
81 Utah 580, 21 P.a·c. (2d) 537, page 540: 
"The jury to assume as proven any material con-
troverted fact is held by this ·court in State v. Seymour, 
49 Utah, 285, 163 p·. 789, 792, where the court, speak-
ing through ·Chief Justice Frick, says: 'Courts, in 
charging jurors, should be very careful not to assume 
any material fact or facts. Jurors, who are laymen, are 
always ea~iF to follow the opinion or judgment of the 
court, and .it. the court assumed any material fact in the 
charge, thl'j urors are most likely to follow the assump-
tions of the court. Indeed, we must assume that such 
is the case ·unless the record clearly shows the contrary.' 
"So thoroughly established is this principle that 
it seems almost superfluous to cite authorities. ·When 
the instruction without qualification assumed that the 
offense had been committed, it thereby·relieved the jury 
of the necessity of weighing the eviderice and determin-
ing for itself that question." 
It was also error for the court to tell the jury that if they 
believed she was pregnant and as a result of the blow suffered 
a miscarriage the jury may award her money damages for the 
loss of said unborn child. Such is· not the Ia w as is established 
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by the cases cited below and argued under the next succeeding 
assignments covering the instruction on damages. 
See IVallace v. Portland Ry. L. P. Co. 
(Or) 170 Pac. 283 
Vitale ·v. Biando (Mo.) 52 S. W. 
(2d) 24 
VI. 
ERRORS IN INSTRUCTION AS TO DAMAGES 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 22 AND 23 
'In instruction No. 7 considered next above, the court in 
the last half of the instruction twice emphasized the "unborn 
child" idea and now in this instruction tells the jury she rna y 
recover "for the loss of her unborn child'' when in fact the only 
evidence she personally gave of such a being was that she had 
missed her regular menstrual period some two weeks before the 
trouble. 
The instruction reads as follows : 
"The court instructs you, members of the jury, that 
if you find the issues in this case in favor of plaintiff and 
against the defendants, you may find for the plaintiff 
such a sum as will compensate her for the following 
damages, not to exceed $5,000.00: 
"1. The actual personal injuries which she suf-
fered; 
"2. ·The consequent pain and suffering which she 
suffered as a result of her physical injuries; 
"3~ Money damages for the loss of her unborn 
child as ~ result of said miscarriage. 
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"In addition to the amount named above, you may 
also assess such damages as will eompensate· for the 
loss or injury to her clothing, not to exceed the sum of 
$75.00." (Tr. 247-.248) 
We took one exception to the instruction ·as a whole and 
then exceptions to each separate paragraph of the instruction. 
(Tr. 254-5) · 
It is our position that paragraph three statingt~at.appellee 
can recover "money damages for the loss of her unbor;n child" 
is had in and of itself and that it renders' the entire instruction 
bad because read along with the other parts of the instruction it 
leads the jury to award damages taking·all elements together, 
which is not warranted under any theory. · · 
The allegations or prayer of appellee's amended complaint 
do not set out any basis for the giving of such an in:struction 
nor is there any evidence of loss of companionship or ;value of 
lost services to support the same. In addition such an element 
of damage is fundamentally too remote. . . 
That the instruction and that particular par:t speci~~al.~y 
excepted to is bad and not the law is forcibly set out by the 
Supreme Court of Oregon in Wallace. v. Portland, Ry. L. P. 
Co., supra, where the court said: 
"Considering the first assignment of error, the 
theory of the plaintiff advanced in support of the tes'ti-. 
mony concerning the sex of the child and the .. state of 
advancement of the fetal life was that it was 'material 
to the mother with regard to loss 0£ service.' This was 
referable to the allegation of the complaint about the 
loss. of the child and the p~edication of damages there-
on. No question is made, and there can be none, but 
that a plaintiff, a pregnant woman, may ·recover for the 
pain and injury, both physical and mental, experienced 
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by her from a miscarriage brought about l:>y the negli-
gent act of a defendant. She is entitled to h~ye nature 
in such cases work out its proper function in due time. 
Any disturbance of the period or proces~ of gestation 
resulting in her injury is actionable. It i$ onlyJ how-
ever, for the inju-ry to her tha.t she can recovef!. She ha.s 
110 action for .the loss of the child. The in.jt1ry, if any, 
is too remote and speculative to form a basis for dam-
ages. The principle is succinctly stated in the closing 
paragraph of a note to Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities R. R. 
Co., 23 L.R~A. 142, thus: 
" 'The review of the decisions shows that they are 
in almost entire harmony in holding that miscarriage 
may be one of the effect:s of wrong for which recovery 
may be had. They also show that the effect on the 
mother alpne is to b~ consid~red, and recovery for mis-
carriage allowed only so far as it is part of her personal 
injuri~s, riot in.~luding any recompens~ for loss pf antic-
ipated offspring.' " (citing ~ases). 
The same rule is laid down jn Vitalf rq. Bia.ndo (Mo.) 
supra. There th~ court stated : 
"In this state of the record we have in mind th;;tt 
the physical injuries suffered by~ f~male thrQpgh n~gli­
gence of another, occasioning a miscarriage, will op-
erate as~ cause of action in her favor to the extent that 
she may be injured thereby in the impairment of health 
and increased suffering of body and mind, occasioned 
by the miscarriage, over and beyond that which usually 
attends ~ birth in due cour&e, (Jut the lpss of th~ ()if-
sPring itself is not to l}~ considere(l as an injury to her, 
for the rea:son that the basis of a r~cov~ry on thf! part 
of a parent for the death of a child by the 'pegligence of 
another is the value of the services of the child 'to the 
parent during minority, and therefore, a recovery for 
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the loss of a prospective offspring, it is said, would ex-
tend the field of damage into the realm of mere pos-
sibility. 'Of course, the loss of the anticipated society 
of the prospective child and mere matters of sentiment 
which attend such misfortunes are too remote for con-
sideration by the ·courts as a basis for monetary com-
pensation, though the law be humane, in its policy and 
purpose.' Finer v. Nichols, 158 Mo. App.· 539, 138 
S. W. 889, 892, and cases cited therein." 
VII. 
THE JUDGMENT IS EXCESSIVE AND IS 
NOT SUSTAINED BY LAW 
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO. 24 
From the points discussed in this brief so far it seems to 
us there can be no question but that the court erred in receiving 
the verdict and entering judgment thereon, because it is es.tab-
lished that the verdict is excessive and against the la~. 
The event in issue here happened on June 22, 1940. The 
appellee filed her complaint on September 6, 1940, and in that 
complaint did not allege one fact to the effect that she was preg-
nant or that she had had a miscarriage. In fact she alleged an 
entirely different set of facts than those alleged in her amended 
complaint as a basis for her recovery. {Tr. 1-2-13A-13-C and 
D). 
By her own testimony she never went to see a doctor until 
long after the complaint was filed. It was late in October, 1940, 
when she went to see Dr. Giesy. Then nothing was said to 
appellants about a claimed miscarriage until the 11th of Decem-
ber, 1940, when the parties were about to go to trial, at which 
time, she filed art amendment to her complaint. 
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As pointed out in the next preceding assignment the basis 
given by the court upon which the jury was allowed to deter-
mine the damages in this case has no support in the law. There-
fore it follows that the verdict must be excessive and the judg-
ment against the law. It is impossible for the court to appor-
tion the verdict to the different elements of damage set out by 
the court in its instruction. 
VIIL 
COURT ERRED IN DENYTNG MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
ASSIGNMENT Q.F ·ERROR NO. 25 
The appellants within time, after entry of judgment in this 
case, filed their motion for .a new trial which was argued to the 
court. He denied the motion. 
The grounds upon which we contend the court erred in 
taking such action are fully argued in this brief and consequent-
ly there is no need to restate them here. It is our position that 
the trial court should, based upon the errors committed in the 
trial of the case~ have granted appellants a new trial. 
In conclusion for the reasons stated in this brief appellants 
pray this court that it reverse the judgment entered in this case 
and remand said case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JUDD, RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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